Optionality: Some reasons seem to be "optional"-merely reasons it makes sense to act on if one chooses-whereas other reasons are normatively conclusive-reasons it does not make sense not to act on. How should this difference be understood?
belief and knowledge. The fact that a cognitivist account provides a more natural and attractive interpretation of interpersonal argument about reasons is, moreover, a ground for preferring it.
In discussion after my third lecture Ralph Wedgwood and John Broome offered an objection along the following lines. A normative belief that one has conclusive reason to act does not always lead to subsequent action. This indicates that in those cases in which action does ensure the explanation of the action involves the presence of something more, in addition to this belief-an additional element of motivation. I can see the appeal of this argument, but it seems to me to get things backwards. A rational agent is so constituted that his or her normative beliefs generally lead to action in accord with these beliefs. But we are not perfectly rational: things can go wrong. We can be distracted, depressed, too focused on certain pleasures even though we can see that they are not good reasons. Akratic behavior is explained in these ways as a malfunction of the apparatus, as a result of which what would normally be sufficient to produce action does not do so. What goes wrong might be described as a lack of "motivation," but what this means is just a failure of the normal functioning of the agent's rational capacities, not the absence of some needed element in addition to normally functioning capacities and a normative belief.
I stated the question of the "ground of truth" in the following way: "In virtue of what are claims about reasons true, when they are true? Does the idea that claims about reasons are true or false, independent of our opinions about them, and that truths about reasons are irreducibly normative, have unacceptable metaphysical implications?" I argued in Lecture 2 that the idea that there are irreducibly normative truths about practical reasons does not have unacceptable metaphysical implications. In my view there are normative facts only in the minimal sense in which these are "merely the reflection of true normative beliefs." More strongly, my view of the relation between normative and non-normative facts implies that no non-normative facts could be the "ground of truth" for normative truths. Non-normative facts can be the things "in virtue of which" normative claims are true only by being the facts which are reasons, not by "grounding" in any sense the fact that these things are reasons. The fact that this metal is sharp is a reason for me not to press my hand against it. But the fact that this is a reason has no non- Equilibrium. Insofar as this method is just one of seeking coherence in our own attitudes, it may be doubted that it can yield justified belief about matters independent of us. It will be helpful in answering this question and the question of determinateness to say a more about the nature and status of this process.
As Rawls describes the method, it proceeds as follows. One begins by identifying a set of considered judgments about the subject. These are the judgments that seem clearly to be correct, and seem so under conditions that are conducive to making good judgments of the relevant kind: when one is fully informed about the matter in question, thinking carefully and clearly about it, and not subject to conflicts of interest or other factors that are likely to distort one's judgment. These judgments may be of any level of generality: in the case at hand, judgments about what is or is not a reason in specific cases, for example, or more general claims about what kinds of things can be reasons, or what it is for something to be a reason.
The second stage of the process is to try to formulate principles that would "account for" these judgments. This means principles such that, had one simply been trying to apply them, rather than trying to decide what seemed to one to be the case, one would have been led to this same set of judgments. Since one's first attempt to come up with such principles is unlikely to be successful, there is a third stage, in which one decides how to respond to the divergence between these principles and considered judgments. Should one modify, the judgments that the principles fail to account for, or modify the principles, in hopes of achieving a better fit?
It is likely that some accommodation of both of these kinds may be required. One is then to continue in this way, working back and forth between principles and judgments, until one reaches a set of principles and a set of judgments between which there is no conflict, the state of so-called reflective equilibrium. It should be emphasized that this is not a state we are currently in, or likely to reach. It is rather an ideal, which we struggle to attain. 1 1 In "Reply to Habermas," Rawls says that reflective equilibrium is "a point at infinity we can never reach, though we may get closer to it in the sense that through discussion, our
This method is open to two interpretations. On what might be called the descriptive interpretation its aim is to come up with an accurate description of our views about he subject in question. Rawls sometimes describes it in this way, as a process giving an account of "our moral sense" or "our sense of justice." So understood, the process would not appear to yield conclusions about anything independent of us.
In Rawls's earliest statement of the method "our" seems to be understood collectively, rather than individually. The considered judgments with which we begin are not those of a particular individual but the considered judgments of "competent judges."
If the process is understood in this way, then modifying the considered judgments with which it began in order to better fit the principles one has devised to describe them would seem like fudging the data. This is particularly so if the judgments in question are not just those of the person carrying out the process but also those of other "competent judges."
On the alternative interpretation, which is the one I have in mind, the method of reflective equilibrium is a way of making up one's mind what to think about a subject.
This makes the process, at least initially, a first-person enterprise, and casts the matter of revising one's considered judgments in a different light. 2 When one finds that there is a conflict between a considered judgment and a principle that seems to one to have some support, one has to decide what one really believes. This is not simply a matter of weighing the brute intuitive plausibility of the principle against that of the judgment with which it conflicts. Discovering that a considered judgment conflicts with a plausible ideals, principles, and judgments seem more reasonable to us and we regard them as better founded than they were before." (PL, 385) 2 The considered judgments of others are not irrelevant. They are relevant in calling one's attention to alternatives, raising the question, "Why shouldn't that be among my considered judgments?" But the fact that others do in fact accept it, and whether or not they could be persuaded to change heir minds, does not matter. principle can tell us something new about both. As we saw in the case of Normative Desire theory, counterexamples can undermine the plausibility of a principle by calling our attention to weaknesses in the thinking that led us to it. The reverse can also happen:
when we see what general principles a judgment conflicts with, and see what a general principle supporting it would have to be like, this can undermine the initial plausibility of the judgment itself. As Rawls wrote in a striking paragraph, , "Moral philosophy is Socratic: we may want to change our present considered judgments once their regulative principles are brought to light. And we may want to do this even though these principles are a perfect fit. A knowledge of these principles may suggest further reflections that lead us to revise our judgments."
Although the end result of the process might, ideally, be a set of coherent beliefs (i.e. beliefs that are consistent and mutually supporting) "coherence" is not a good description of what we are seeking in carrying it out. What we are doing is rather testing and evaluating our beliefs in the light of (what else?) those other beliefs that seem most plausible.
The Method of Reflective Equilibrium is a way of deciding what to believe about a subject. It is not itself an account of the truth about that subject. It would be a mistake to say that the truth about practical reasons is given by those judgments about reasons that we would accept in reflective equilibrium. The judgments one would accept at the end of a process of seeking reflective equilibrium will depend on the judgments one has considered as possibilities, the correctness of one's decisions about which of them to regard initially as considered judgments, and the correctness of the decisions one makes at each stage about how and whether to revise or reject judgments and or principles that account for them or fail to do so. Its dependence on these substantive questions would make such an account of the truth about a subject matter trivial. The method of reflective equilibrium is a way of coming up with an account of a subject matter, it is not itself not such an account. Why should we think about a subject in the way that the method of reflective equilibrium prescribes? In particular, why look for general principles that "account for" our considered judgments? Before answering this question I need to address an ambiguity in the understanding of the method. When Rawls first introduced the method of reflective equilibrium he described it as beginning with considered judgments about what is right and wrong in particular cases. In later versions he expanded the starting points to include those judgments of any level of generality in which we have most confidence. This would include, in addition to judgments about particular cases of right, wrong, justice or injustice, general maxims (promises ought to be kept, slavery is always wrong), and judgments about the kinds of considerations that are relevant or irrelevant to questions of rightness and justice. Rawls even says that in order to reach what he calls "wide reflective equilibrium" we should "consider other plausible conceptions [other than the one we hav arrived at] and assess their supporting grounds. Taking this process to the limit, one seeks the conception, or plurality of conceptions, that would survive the rational consideration of all feasible conceptions and all reasonable arguments for them." (CP 289) Once the process is described in such inclusive terms it may truly seem that there is no alternative to it. Bt at the same time, and for the same reason, it may seem that there is nothing to it. The "method" is just to think carefully about a question, taking into account and assessing everything that seems potentially relevant to it. This seems to me largely correct. The distinctive content of the method is negative: in its refusal to give privileged status either to particular judgments or to any class of more general truths, axioms, or a priori principles. Everything is up for grabs. This brings us back to the question I raised before launching off on this digression: why seek more general principles to "account for" our particular judgments (or, more exactly, to systematize those judgments of varying degrees of generality with which we began)? I will mention two possible aims in doing so: large scale and small scale. The large scale aim is to come up with an overall characterization of the subject, his or her hand against it. It is one of our considered judgments that this is so in many circumstances, but it is not always so. It is another considered judgment that someone can have good reason to try to cut his hand. So the conditions c in our original statement have to be stated so as to preclude such cases. Searching for the relevant c is a matter of trying to find a (low level) principle that "accounts for" our considered judgments about when we have reason not to press our hand against the metal. But this could just as well be described as a process of trying to figure out what these implicitly general considered judgments really are.
Most of our day to day thinking about reasons for action takes place within a framework of accepted judgments of this kind. When it seems to us that, as David
Wiggins might put it, "There is nothing to think but that p is a reason," we may be saying (as perhaps we are in the case of pain) that the judgment that p is a reason seems to us, on reflection, so obvious that we cannot imagine its being mistaken, or we may be recognizing that p's being a reason clearly follows from more general precepts about reasons that have this status for us. Are facts about practical reasons, as I have described them, independent of us?
"Independence" can mean a number of different things, which need to be distinguished.
Facts about reasons are relational facts, about the significance of certain natural facts for rational agents. They thus are not facts "out there" having nothing to do with us. But this is not the kind of dependence that might seem problematic.
It is sometimes said that facts about reasons are dependent on us because there would be no reasons in a world without rational agents. Certainly there would be no point to talking about reasons in the absence of rational agents for whom these are reasons. But it could still be true of certain facts that if there were agents (in the relevant circumstances) then these facts would be reasons for them, if they existed. I have shown how to express the ideas of relative strength and optionality. There remains the question of the kind of thinking through which we arrive at conclusions of this form.
Desire theories and hedonistic theories offer extremely general accounts of reasons and their strength. They also suggest a methodology for assessing reasons and their strengths that is atomistic: to determine the strength of a reason, on either account, we focus on it: on the desire or the amount of pleasure that supports it. If, after rejecting these theories, we retain this methodological picture we may seem to be maintaining that reasons have an ineffable property of strength, which we can assess just by focusing carefully on them in the right way. This kind of case-by-case intuition seems implausible. which one is thinner but has missed out on many sweets to a life in which one is heavier but has had these enjoyments. This is naturally seen as reflecting the fact that one has stronger reason to be thinner than to have these enjoyments.
I will mention one other class of cases, just to distinguish it from these. Particular relationships with others may require holding certain judgments of strength. Being a friend requires thinking that the friend's interests give rise to stronger reasons than one's own convenience, and in most cases stronger reasons than the comparable interests of strangers. Being related to others by common commitment to a cause or value, requires taking that consideration to give stronger reason than other things do.
The point of these examples is just to indicate how our views about the relative strength reflect a larger set of normative attitudes rather than being isolated reactions to relative quantities of some normative, or non-normative property.
I have suggested that we assess our beliefs about reasons for action and decide whether they are correct by engaging in a process of seeking reflective equilibrium among our normative beliefs. But different people, applying this method conscientiously, can reach different conclusions. In cases in which there is such disagreement, how can the kind of correctness that this process can deliver really matter? Isn't some further kind of correctness required? To answer this question it will help to consider a particular matter about which people disagree.
Does the fact that a certain form of behaviour is required by the traditions of my society give me a reason to engage in it? Suppose I think at the outset that it does not.
Traditions can be bad. When they are not bad, I think, the reasons we have to do what they require depend simply on their merits.
How do I decide whether this is the case, or whether there is some further tradition-based reason that I am missing? I consider various examples in which it seems that this might be the case, and consider what the reason in question might be and how it might be explained. The fact that a certain form of behaviour is traditional in a society may mean that many, perhaps most people in that society would be disapproving, perhaps shocked at my failure to follow it. If I have reason not to shock, then this is a reason (whether the society is mine or not.) More positively, if I have reason to want to be understood by most people in a society as expressing a certain attitude, such as love and respect for a recently deceased person, and sadness that she has died, then I will have reason to do whatever is the traditional expression of those attitudes.
But the suggestion I began with, that the fact that something is traditional in my society can be a reason to do it, seems to aim at something more fundamental than these instrumental and communicative reasons. What might that be? Here is another thought.
There is a special pleasure in doing things with other people with a shared sense of the meaning of these activities for all of you. This is not only pleasant, but a pleasure worth seeking. Moreover, in some cases the shared sense of meaning involves the idea that these activities have been and will continue to be repeated over time. Part of the significance, and value, lies in this repetition and intention to repeat as an expression of enduring connection among the varying participants over time. Seeing the existence of this practice as giving one no reason to continue it is incompatible with sharing in the good involved-incompatible with being related to the other participants in the way that this good requires. This does not mean that one necessarily has reason to continue the practice. That depends on whether one has reason to continue in the relation it involves.
Some shared activities are bad even if the participants enjoy and are 'bonded' by them.
This fits with the thought I mentioned at the outset, that not all traditions give reasons. The same point can be put in terms of optionality. Is the reason one has to continue a practice an optional one (something there is reason to do, but just one reason among others-one might go to a film instead)? Sharing in the good of participating in that practice is likely to preclude seeing the reason to continue as optional in this way.
But the further question is whether seeing oneself as such a member is itself optional. I believe that with respect to almost all groups (smaller than the moral community itself) the answer is yes. Being in a position to be part of a group of the kind I have described given on the opportunity to have a certain good, but it is one good among many and the reasons for pursuing it, thought good reasons, are generally optional in the sense I described. Groups that take the opposite view are tyrannical.
What I have just said seems right to me, but I imagine that much of it is controversial. Indeed, I hope that at least some of it is controversial, because I have said it with two purposes in mind. Suppose, for example that she objects to a principle that would forbid certain conduct by claiming that that conduct is required by traditions of her society and that she therefore has good reason to want to be able to engage in that conduct. I believe, on the other hand, based on my analysis of such reasons, that they are not strong enough to support this claim: they do not make it reasonable to reject the principle in question. The moral question turns on the reasonableness of her proposed rejection, that is to say on the strength of the relevant reasons. I can't answer it except by forming a judgment about this question, and having arrived at such a judgment I have no further decision about how to answer it. So the fact of disagreement is again irrelevant, and the only kind of 'authority' that judgment of this sort needs to have is simply being a correct assessment of the relevant reasons.
This result may be made clearer by making explicit the possibility that third parties may be involved. The reason why it is not reasonable to reject the principle for the reason given, the value of continuing tradition, is that the cost of continuing it to others is too high. The agent in question and these third parties may disagree about this, because they disagree say, about the value of continuing tradition. To form an opinion about the permissibility of the conduct in question one must take a position on this disagreement. Questions about what we have reason to do are questions we are capable of thinking about in the ways I have described. If one has thought carefully about such a question in this way, and sees no objection to it, then there is nothing further one can do to decide whether it is correct. But even if this is all we can do, it would be complacent to infer from this that it is enough. As I have stressed, it is not enough to ensure that the conclusion we have reached is correct. We might have made a mistake in our reasoning.
But the question whether we have done this is just anther first-order normative question, calling for, and answerable by more reasoning of the same kind. The charge of complacency that I am imagining claims to go farther: it is that this kind of reasoning might be inadequate because it fails to be in touch at any point with the normative facts.
The idea is that there might be facts about which things are reasons for action that we need to "be in contact with" or "be sensitive to" in some way other than through the process I have described in order for our conclusions about reasons to be sound. But I do not see how there could be facts of this kind that were normatively relevant. Facts about reasons are the sort of thing we can think about and assess through a process of the sort I have described. There is no way of "being in touch with them" except through this very process.
This is not to justify complacently thinking that we have gotten it right in regard to reasons. But the thought that we might not have is a thought internal to this reflective process, and the grounds for concern on this ground are also internal to it: they lie in the weakness and indeterminacy of the forms of reasoning that it involves.
Christine Korsgaard has written that on a substantive realist account of reasons we have nothing more to go on than our confidence that, after thinking about what reasons we have, we have gotten it right. She intends this as a criticism of a view of the kind I have been defending. But I there is something right about what she is saying. We do have nothing to rely on except our best judgments about which things are reasons. Often our confidence in these judgments justified; sometimes it is not. But that's life. There is nothing more that we could have. To be realistic about reasons we must accept this fact.
